Page History

• FEL-based X-rays in TAX
• Laser-based Hard Radiation - new 420.2b 2D requirement.  Maze might need to be independently searchable - HPS design can accommodate independent access in TAO vs. TAX.  Radiation Interlock System (RIS) for MEC configuration will not work for MEC-U.  Currently an appendage of HPS.  Need to interface with RRL design team now to consider interlocks/enclosures, etc.  Hope to use devices like stoppers for multiple safety systems.
  • E. Chin:  HPS will need to be interlocked with laser shutters?  Eric: Currently administratively controlled by RGDAS.  Attenuator - hardware independent of LSS.  Or, remove attenuator and insert stopper.  Analogous to BCS/PPS on Accelerator side.  
  • K. Jobe:  May be a case where a new model is needed–one person/system for gate system, closure, which feeds information to LSS (analogous to BSY–one computer that knows whether personnel chicanes are searched or not, another for laser systems).  Offline discussion needed to evaluate.  More complicated deployment than currently exists at SLAC.
• Laser Radiation.  Class 4 lasers present in all areas, requires independent Laser Safety Systems (LSSs).
  • M. Woods:  Makes sense to have 4 independent PLCs, but supervisor to tie together would be a good idea.  K. Jobe - same challenge for Cu and SC beams.  Multiplicity took several man-years.  Currently 6 PLCs that handle various aspects.  Can be very complicated.  Mike - Class 4 lasers in each lab.  Eric - may be Class 4 alignment lasers.
  • J. Liu:  RP stopper vs. LSS shutter.  Eric clarified.
  • M. Woods:  Cascading logic.  Need to think through fault scenarios.  Eric - many configurations/logic, and large stoppers will be a challenge.  Stopper locations will likely drive allowable operation configurations.
• Electrical Discharge/Stored Power.  LLE implements stay-out zone for (dis/) charging cap banks, requires personnel sweep interface with LSS (electrical and audial hazard).  Will need hazard controls for HE-LP and mezzanine area.  Laser-adjacent safety constraint.  
  • K. Jobe:  current research on-going.  Some flexibility will be needed because it's impossible to foresee all hazards during operations.
  • E. Chin:  HPS uses hutch-independent PLCs plus supervisor.  Changes to supervisor require re-certification to all independent systems.  Eric points out that this results in unexpected delays.  Ed: suggests making changes before a certification cycle.
  • S. Ronni:  Operational parameters - important to have upgrades in mind wrt ionizing radiation.  Important consideration for shielding.  Environmental aspects must also be considered (groundwater).  Internal processes for reviews–important to have them scheduled for resource planning.
• Laser Self-Destruction - Machine Protection System

Next Steps?

Steven:  In information-gathering mode.  Need follow-up meeting.  Dig deeper in some other topics, like supervisory PLC.  Example in hutches?  Ed can provide an overview.  Supervisory might help with communication between different zones.  Beam switching permit used in LCLS-II (Cu/SC).

• M. Woods:  List of safety devices beyond stoppers and attenuators?  Ed - start listing operational modes.
• J. BayerBauer:  RP looking into activation of target chamber and how it will impact operation.

Steven:  Need to consider Partner Labs.

• M. Woods: Typical list for vendors.